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Voting
Voting [Stemme, Ballotation, Votum – noun; stemme — verb]
From Old Danish stæm(m)æ (noun) and stemmelse, stemming, stemning (verbal
nouns). Both seem to go back to Middle Low German, stemme, stemne, stimme
and  stemmen, though the noun is widely attested in Germanic languages. The
base, lexical meaning in Danish is voice; letting your voice ring out, be heard.
Qualified,  it  means  voicing  one’s  opinion,  making  one’s  views  known,  giving
one’s consent. It’s related to the Danish  bestemme,  decide or determine, and
most likely to  Stævne  as well  (Old Danish,  stefnæ,  Old Norse,  stefna)  which
means gathering,  negotiation  meeting.  Ballotation  simply  means a  ballot  and
comes from the French balloter, which refers to the procedure of using black and
white balls to decide a vote. Votum means a ballot or election too, or the written
or oral statement meant to influence people to cast their vote in a certain way. It’s
a loanword  from Latin  where  it  had clear  religious overtones again,  meaning
solemnly swear, taking an oath.1
The  semantic  range  of  the  words  Kierkegaard  uses  is  quite  broad
then,  echoing a rich political  culture and history.  This can be schematized in
the following way:  Actual  participation  in deliberating, determining, and ratifying
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policies or laws (i),  judging or criticizing these publicly (ii),  taking an oath for
government  service  (iii),  casting  a  vote  (iv).  As  far  as  we  can  tell  pre-state
Denmark (before c. 900 A.D.) had a mixed system of government,2 meaning that
a chieftain or king usually took the lead in public affairs but since his authority or
power wasn’t meant to be absolute he always had to rely on the active support of
the aristocracy and the common people. The public arenas for this mutual trust
were deliberative and general assemblies. Every free man who could carry a
weapon basically had the right to attend the latter. Even if only the King and the
aristocrats could speak on matters of policy and law here, ordinary people had a
voice too, making their judgment heard by shouts of approval or dissent (cf. ( i).3
With state-formation and the coming of Christianity there’s an ideological shift
towards absolute monarchy, but the Danish king remained quite weak for a long
time  and  still  had  to  rely  a  great  deal  on  the  consent  of  his  subjects.
Representative assemblies were set up, a state assembly (Rigsdag) above all,
with broad veto powers and the participation of all estates of the land (church,
nobility, ordinary people). Peasant farmers and artisans remained free for a long
time therefore, enjoying a political and economical standing unheard of even by
Western  European  standards.  It’s  only  after  the  Reformation  and  with  the
emergence  of  the  Modern  bureaucratic  state  really  (c.  1600-1800  A.D.)  that
Denmark turns into an absolute monarchy, with the Danish king becoming one of
2 See A. R. Meyers,  Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789, London: Thames and Hudson
Ltd. 1975, for the general political trajectory of Europe and Denmark.
3 Cf. also Tacitus, Germ. c. 11, 40.  
the  most  absolute  rulers  in  all  of  Europe  (cf.  (iii).4 By  this  time,  however,
the  Enlightenment  sets  in  and  events  out  in  Europe  are  starting  to  put
pressure  on  the  Danish  Crown  to  allow  freedom  of  the  press  (cf.  ( ii)  and
universal male suffrage (cf. (iv). This leads to the establishing of constitutional
monarchy  and  a  parliamentary  system  in  1849,  making  Denmark  into  one
of the most liberal democracies in Europe at that time (cf.  (i)-(iv).  This is the
Denmark of  Kierkegaard’s  lifetime,  a  society  and culture he remained largely
at odds with as we’ll see.       
You don’t find a fully thought-out concept of voting in the Kierkegaardian
corpus. The words appear most often in the  Nachlass  by far. A quick survey
reveals a negative and even disparaging take on the notion and practice of voting
itself, as well as most of its semantic range. By cross-referencing “voting” with
words like “The Numerical”, “The Majority”, and “Democracy” one gets a sense of
why that is: Voting stands opposed to single individuality (1). The most eloquent
attack  is  found  in  his  review  of  the  Two  Ages  however.  Here  Kierkegaard
charges contemporary society with being worldly-wise and shallow in its thinking
and for lacking true passion. He blames Modern, representational government
and the rise of the public and the printing press for this general lack of spirit, all of
which are tied up with voting (2). Kierkegaard thinks active citizenship and single
individuality cancel each other out somehow, and he seems to have preferred
4 See  also  Philip  S.  Gorski,  “The  Protestant  Ethic  and  the  Bureaucratic  Revolution:  Ascetic
Protestantism  and  Administrative  Rationalization  in  Early  Modern  Europe”,  in  Max  Weber’s
‘Economy and Society’, ed. by Charles Camic, Philip S. Gorski, and David M. Trubek, Stanford:
Stanford University Press 2005, pp. 267-296.
going back to absolute monarchy instead. This bent for personal, non-reciprocal
ties over public ones also comes out well in his ethico-religious writings (3). What
the  Kierkegaardian  corpus  is  trying  to  do  basically  is  to  criticize  or  else  get
beyond  the  Danish—European—political  tradition.  This  raises  the  question  of
what his stance towards politics actually is (4).
(1) The Journals, Papers, Notebooks: If we turn to the places where voting
is mentioned, we see the uses are all negative (or else literary or reporting only). 
(a) Truth isn’t decided by mass vote or public opinion, but by 
      individuals basically.5
(b) Nothing infinite, nothing of real weight and significance in fact, 
      can ever be settled this way.6
(c) There’s no real learning or character formation that happens by
      discussion or balloting either.7
(d) Voting is a form of dispersion, a nonsensical (Nonsens) way of
      reaching a decision (Afgjørelses Middel).8 To think one can 
      achieve anything by voting is irresponsible (Uforsvarligt).9
(e) To deny any of this or to submit real matters to majority 
      judgment is to confuse and externalize everything. Truth is 
      exchanged for mere need and gain;10 majority rule turns into a 
5 SKS 20, 127 / KJN 4, 127-8; SKS 24, 224/ JP 4, 4875.          
6 SKS 17, 295 / KJN 1, 286-7; SKS 24, 224, 227, 230-1 / JP 4, 4875, 4199, 4201.
7 SKS 24, 224-5/ JP 6, 6728; SKS 24, 256 / JP 4, 4208.  
8 SKS 23, 246; SKS 24, 239-40 / JP 4, 4203.             
9 SKS 24, 224-5 / JP 6, 6728.
10 SKS 23, 59-60 / JP 1, 986.              
        kind of idolatry—evil. The Christian has a positive duty to stay 
        away from all this.11 
There’s a general slide here (a)-(d) that’s kind of hard to track. It’s difficult to see
how (e) follows too. What is it about voting, exactly, that makes it so trivial yet
highly dangerous at the same time?
(f) Voting is based on the principle of multiplicity or number (Det
               Numeriske), which means rule by the majority (Majoriteten) and 
               the crowd (Mængden). Where there are many, there is relativity. 
               This is directly opposed to the single individual.12 
(g) Democracy (Demokratiet, Folkeregjeringen) has multiplicity as 
      its basic, organizing principle. This means the downfall of 
      everything great, everything holy. The demand for positive 
      participation and recognition from everybody makes it the most 
      tyrannical form of government, certainly the most void of spirit 
      (aandløseste).13Democracy is the true image of hell.14 
It’s  tempting  to  see  all  this  as  a  piece  of  hyperbole:  To  take  Kierkegaard’s
negative comments about voting and majority rule (a)-(g) as a healthy corrective
11 SKS 23, 37-38.           
12 SKS 20, 371-2 / KJN 4, 371-2; SKS 24, 97 / JP 4, 4190.
13 SKS 20, 371-2 / KJN 4, 371-2; Pap. VIII A 557 / JP 4, 4144. Cf. SKS 7, 563  / CUP 1, 620-1. 
14 Pap. VIII A 557.
to mixing up politics with  either morality or religion, or as a warning perhaps
against giving clear priority to the former over the latter two in our lives. This
guarding against the tyranny of majority  opinion as well as majority rule makes
good liberal sense and Kierkegaard is one of the first Modern thinkers to do this
actually. There’s still a sense in which voting is disparaged here though, indeed
political life as a whole (cf. (i)-(iv). 
(2)  Two Ages:  The same deep misgivings are found here, a work also
written under his real  name. First we get a brilliant lesson on the dangers of
Modern, representative rule: 
(a) There’s a real difference between reflection (Reflexion) or deliberation
                 (Overveielse) on the one hand, and decision (Afgjørelse) and action
       (Handling) on the other. This must always be kept in mind.15
(b) Every form of reflection or deliberation that doesn’t lead to real 
      decision and action isn’t only an abstraction, but a kind of evasion and 
      dodging of real, individual responsibility.16
(c) Modern democracy is based on representation, which means it tends 
                to restrict the scope for real decision-making and action on the part of 
                the many, the ordinary citizens.17
(d) This is closely tied to the rise of the public (Publikum) and a printing 
                 press (Pressen) devoted to public opinion (Publikums Mening). Both 
                 the public itself and its opinions are abstractions that tend to foster 
15 SKS 8, 62-6, 74 / TA, 64-8; 77.
16 Ibid.
17 SKS 8, 66-7, 72-3, 76 / TA, 68-9, 74-5, 79. 
                 calculation (Beregning); a worldly-wise (Forstandighed, Klogskab) and
                 at bottom irresponsible way of thinking and behaving.18
(e) This leads to a general leveling (Nivellering) of all meaningful
       distinctions again. The tearing-down of the wall between the public 
                 and the private spheres isn’t only damaging to government, but to real 
                 learning and character formation as well.19
(f)  It’s the reciprocal recognition (gjensidig Anerkjendelse) underlying this 
     kind of shallow, shared deliberation (gjensidig Klogskab) that’s to 
     blame for all this.20  
          (g) That and the purely numerical, arithmetic way of gauging public opinion
                and deciding things in general.21
The reason Kierkegaard is highly critical  of Modern democracy then is that it
confuses  key  distinctions  in  human  life  and  that  it  tends  to  encourage
irresponsibility (cf. (1e) over). If it’s objected that this might be true of the masses
perhaps but that their representatives still  have room for real decision-making
here and therefore for genuine reflection or deliberation as well, then Kierkegaard
would answer  back: Since they’re  ultimately bound by public opinion and the
decision of the voters, they tend to hide or avoid real authority and leadership. So
18 SKS 8, 66ff. / TA, 68ff.
19 SKS 8, 80ff. / TA, 84ff.
20 SKS 8, 69 / TA, 72.
21 SKS 8, 80, 95ff. / TA, 84, 100ff.
their deliberation is bound to be shallow as well.22 This is a deep and original
point about Modern democracy. Irresponsibility it seems is a structural trait about
representational rule. It’s no secret that it’s voting that lies at the root of all this for
Kierkegaard. That’s also why he seems to think you can’t have more authentic
forms of public reason under this form of government either (cf. (i)-(ii). 
(3)  The  Ethico-Religious  Writings:  To  get  a  sharper  sense  how  that’s
a  given  for  Kierkegaard,  we  need  to  link  this  up  with  his  thoughts  on  the
human being in general. Why is it that more authentic forms of deliberation and
active  citizenship  can’t  be  combined with  a  system of  government  based on
voting? The quick answer:
(a) Because there’s no such thing as positive or real reciprocity among 
                humans.23 Reciprocity is fake, or only acceptable in a Pickwickian 
                sense. Voting assumes the contrary, which is why it’s the root of all evil
                for Kierkegaard.
(4)  Kierkegaard and the Political:  It  would seem that insofar as democracy is
based on voting it’s not a legitimate form of government in Kierkegaard’s eyes.
It’s  hard  to  see  how  the  new-fangled  parliamentary  democracy  of  1849  in
Denmark or the Liberal democracy we have today—or any democracy we can
imagine for that matter—can be kept or reformed if Kierkegaard is right. One gets
the sense it’s the very mutuality of the trust itself, and the freedom and equality of
22 SKS 8, 100ff. / TA, 106ff.
23 This is always assumed, but never argued, in the Kierkegaardian corpus.  [See also Narve
Strand, “World that Matters”, In the Shadow of Kierkegaard, ed. by Roman Kralik et al., Toronto,
Acta Kierkegaardiana 2011]
active citizens that goes with it, that troubles Kierkegaard most. It’s this he thinks
has lead to the present order of things, and which stands in the way of a more
single, inward form of human existence. That’s why a preference for absolute
monarchy is in the cards, being that form of government which has the least
amount of citizen participation and which isn’t based on voting, allowing thereby
for the maximum amount of privacy to its subjects.24 The ideal for Kierkegaard, it
seems, would be a world without politics.
To sum up: The notion and practice of voting is tied up with political participation,
public deliberation, and office-holding. It’s a purely extensive, inauthentic means
of reaching decisions for Kierkegaard; being based, he thinks, on an illusory idea
of positive, reciprocal freedom and equality.  At best it  tends to foster shallow
reflection and irresponsibility. At worst, it simply levels the distinction between the
public  and  the  private  spheres.  This  means  it’s  directly  opposed  to  single
individuality  (and  to  religious  life).  Voting  is  the  organizing  principle  in  a
democracy,  which  makes  it  the  worst  form  of  government  from  a  religious
existentialist  point  of  view.  The ideal  would  be a  world  where  voting,  citizen
politics itself, played little or no part. Absolute monarchy then is the best form
of government to live under for a Christian. 
24 SKS 7, 563/ CUP 1, 620; Pap. VIII A 557 / JP 4, 4144.
See  also:  common  man;  crowd,  the/public,  the;  decision/resolve;  individual;
law; leveling; politics; press, the/journalism; Protestantism/Reformation; society;
state, the; truth; will.
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